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African swine fever (ASF) has one of the highest case-fatality rates among pig diseases.
Europe was considered ASF-free for about two decades until 2007, when the virus was
introduced into Georgia. Since then, it has been identified throughout Eastern Europe,
and reached Belgium in late 2018, increasing the risk of ASF being introduced into
neighboring countries—namely Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France.
French authorities have therefore reinforced surveillance measures to improve the
probability of detecting ASF rapidly if it emerges in France. Predictive modeling may help
to anticipate the extent of virus spread and evaluate the efficiency of these surveillance
measures. A previously published and well-documented model that simulates ASF virus
spread was therefore tailored to realistically represent the French situation in terms of
the geographic distribution of swine production sites and the commercial trade between
them on the one hand, and the implementation of surveillance protocols on the other.
The outcomes confirmed the moderate spread of ASF through the swine trade network,
a situation that had been previously highlighted for the case of Denmark. However, the
diversity of the French pig production landscape has revealed a huge potential for the
geographic dispersal of the virus, especially should the index case occur in a low-density
area, with a median source-to-case distance reaching 300 km. Free-range herds, which
are more likely to have interactions with wild boars, were also identified as potential
entrance gate for the virus. Transmissions from conventional herds were quasi-exclusively
due to swine movement on the commercial network, representing 99% of transmission
events. In contrast, 81% of transmission events occurred in the neighborhood of the
index herd when the virus was introduced in free-range herds. The current surveillance
measures were found relatively efficient for detecting the virus in large herds, leading
to detection rates of 94%. However, infections on smaller production sites—which
often have free-range herds—were more difficult to detect and would require screening
protocols specifically targeting these smaller herds.
Keywords: pig, notifiable disease, modeling, epidemiology, ASF
Andraud et al. ASF Surveillance, Spread and Control
INTRODUCTION
African swine fever virus is a DNA virus belonging to the
Asfarviridae family (1). With a case-fatality rate close to
100%, ASF has huge economic consequences not only at herd
level but also at country level, due to the ban on exports
following its emergence in a country officially free from the
disease (2, 3).
To date, sub-Saharan Africa is seriously affected by ASF,
the virus being endemic in several countries (4). Despite a few
sporadic outbreaks successfully and rapidly contained and local
endemicity on the island of Sardinia, Europe was considered free
from ASF for about two decades until 2007, when the virus was
introduced into Georgia via infected waste fed to domestic pigs.
The waste originated from Africa and was brought to Georgia by
boat (5). The virus spread through Russia and Ukraine, where
it particularly affected wild fauna (6, 7). It continued to spread
in Eastern Europe between 2012 and 2014, affecting both wild
boars and domestic pigs. It spread very quickly through the
Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) before emerging
in Poland (8) then finally reaching the Czech Republic in June
2017. Owing to strong control measures based on fencing in
the infected area, intensive hunting of wild boars and the active
search for carcasses, the Czech Republic was declared ASF-free
by the European Commission in late February 2019, after 6
months without any ASF-positive cases. The opposite case is
illustrated by Romania, where the first notification was reported
in July 2017. This initial incursion had limited consequences in
terms of local spread (9). However, the ongoing epidemic was
initiated 1 year later, with more than 1,000 cases declared in
October 2018 among both domestic and wild fauna. Apart from
the Czech Republic, ASF is now considered endemic in affected
Eastern European countries and a very real threat to Western
Europe (10–12). In September 2018, the first notification of ASF
cases in wild boars was reported in Belgium (13). Although the
origin of the initial case has not yet been fully elucidated, a
human role in this long-distance transmission seems the most
likely (11, 14, 15). Since then and to date, ASF has continued
to spread in wild boars in Belgium, despite the setting up of
strict control measures with physical barriers, active searches for
dead wild boars, the removal of carcasses from the environment,
analysis of every culled or dead wild boar, and intensive hunting
of wild boars within the reinforced observation area, similar to
those implemented in the Czech Republic. To date (2019/03/26),
2059 wild boars have been tested in the surveillance zone, 708
of which have been found positive. The virus’s incursion into
France is imminent due to the shared boundaries between France
and Belgium, the evidenced transmissibility of the virus, and
the movements of wild boars. Although the introduction of
ASF is more likely from this neighboring area via infected wild
boars due to a continuum of the wild boar population across
the border, a sporadic introduction into other areas should
not be excluded because of the disease’s increasing prevalence
among both wild and domestic reservoirs in various Eastern
European countries.
ASF is a notifiable disease according to European legislation,
and strict containment and eradication policies are implemented
in the European Union in the event of its suspicion. However,
such policies require substantial human and financial resources,
which drive the ability to detect the emergence of the virus in
free countries and to control its spread in the meantime (hot
period). Predictive modeling may therefore help to anticipate
the extent of the virus’s spread and to evaluate potential
surveillance and control measures tailored to specific incursion
scenarios. Halasa et al. recently developed such a model
to analyze the epidemiological and economic consequences
of ASF introduction on the swine production network in
Denmark (16, 17). The modeling framework was adapted to
reflect the real-life situation of the French swine production
system and the implementation of recent surveillance and
control policies adopted in response to the imminent ASF
threat. The DTU-DADS-ASF model (16, 17) offers many
different outputs directed toward epidemiology, economics,
and resource requirements to be able to respond to the
emergence of ASF in France. The objective of the present
paper was to evaluate for the first time the epidemiological
consequences of this virus’s introduction into the French
swine production system. We therefore essentially focused
on epidemiological outcomes and detection procedures (e.g.,
the time to detection, duration of the epidemics, and the
number of infected herds) to assess the efficiency of emergency
surveillance plan in light of the diversity of the French swine
production landscape.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The modeling work consisted in tailoring the DTU-DADS-ASF
model fully described in the literature by Halasa et al. (17). Only
a brief overview of the hypotheses and modeling framework
are therefore provided here; a schematic representation being
illustrated in Figure 1. An illustrative example of data formatting
is provided in Supplementary Material 1. The model—
developed to analyze the consequences of ASF introduction
in organized swine production systems—represents the course
of global infection by coupling the dynamics of infection
both within and between herds and representing official
control measures.
Within-Herd Transmission Model
The herd is considered as a homogenous, randomly-mixed
population, independent of its physiological status. The
pigs evolve through five health statuses: susceptible (S),
exposed but not infectious (latent; L), not clinically affected
but infectious (subclinical; Sc), clinically affected (clinical;
C), and not playing a role in transmission (removed, R).
Transmission is assumed to be either through direct contact
between susceptible and infectious animals, or through
environmental contamination due to infected leftovers.
The environmental reservoir (E) is proportional to the
number of ASF-related dead animals, and balanced by
an exponential decay representing the virus’s capacity for
survival in the environment. Using the transmission rate
(β) estimate of Guinat et al. (19), the force of infection
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of DTU-DADS-ASF epidemiological multiscale model (S, Susceptible; L, Latent; Sc, Subclinically infected; Ic, Clinically infected; R,
Removed). Colors on map correspond to the different herd types considered (BS, boar studs; FA, farrowing; FF, farrow-to-finish; FI, finisher; FWP,
Farrowing-post-weaning; MU, multiplier; PW, post-weaning; PWF, post-weaning—finishing; SEL, nucleus; SP, small production; TR, trade center; WB, wild boars) (18).
exerted on susceptible animals at each time t (days) is
expressed by
λt = β ∗
(µ ∗ Sct−1)+ (Ct−1)+ (ε ∗Et−1)
Nt−1
, (1)
Where µ and ε are factors associated with the relative
infectiousness of subclinical animals and infected leftovers,
respectively; Nt−1 represents the herd size at time t − 1.
Transmission is governed by binomial processes with the
infection probability at time t given by pt = 1 −
exp(−λt). The duration of the latent, subclinical and clinical
stages of newly-infected animals are randomly drawn from
probability distributions derived from Halasa et al. (20)
(with a mean duration of 1, 2, and 5 days, respectively).
The herd status is determined by the within-herd infection
dynamics considering that at least one individual in the latent,
subclinical or clinical stage makes the herd change to the
corresponding status.
Between-Herd Transmission Model
Although direct contact through animal movements is deemed
to be essential for ASF transmission, the model framework
accounts for four additional indirect transmission routes. The
transit trucks used to move animals to the slaughterhouse
may call in at several pig farms during the same round, and
therefore represent a risk of ASF introduction. Indirect contact
by external human interventions has been represented through
two levels of risk linked to the frequency of contact with
animals. Medium-risk contact represents the chance of ASF
being introduced by veterinarians or rearing technicians who
are frequently in contact with live animals, while a low-risk
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contact is related to sporadic visitors or feed trucks, which are
potential vectors through environmental contamination. Finally,
local spread was considered within a 2-km radius of an infected
farm to represent potential transmission through shared material
and fomites. For each transmission route, the probabilities of
transmission between production sites are computed daily using
a sequential approach.
Transmission by Direct Contact
For each infected farm, the number of outgoing animals
potentially entering into direct contact with other animals is first
considered based on the actual frequency of movements derived
from the movement database (BDPorc). For direct contact
modeling, the number of animals involved in the movement is
next evaluated depending on the herd size and type of production
site. The destination herd is then randomly selected based on (i)
the distance between the seeder and receiving herd, (ii) the type
of production site, and (iii) the herd size, which has to be large
enough to receive the incoming animals. Finally, the probability
of transmission is evaluated based on both the prevalence of
infectious individuals on the seeder farm and the size of the
incoming batch.
Transmission by Indirect Contact
For medium- and low-risk contact, the number of outgoing
animals is again evaluated using a Poisson distribution with
respective frequencies of contact derived from the literature
(17, 21, 22). The force of infection exerted by an infected herd
is proportional to the within-herd force of infection (Equation
1) with specific transmission rates (17, 23). The transmission
probabilities also factor in the distance according to the same
probability distribution as described by Halasa et al. (17).
Transmission caused by indirect contact through travel to the
slaughterhouse is represented in the same way with the exception
of the number of potential contacts, which follows an exponential
distribution where the average path length (mean number of
herds en route to the slaughterhouse) is used as the distribution
mean (18).
Finally, to represent local spread due to shared material or
fomites, all herds within a 2-km radius of an infected herd are
subjected to a distance-based probability of infection related to
the within–herd force of infection (Equation 1).
Different introduction scenarios were evaluated depending
on the density zone and herd type of the initial case
(nucleus/multiplier or randomly-selected herds). For each
scenario in this study, 2,000 simulations were run to achieve
convergence of the outputs with a stable mean behavior
and variability. Equations and epidemiological parameters are
detailed in the supplementary material of the original paper
describing the modeling framework (17).
Disease Detection and Control Measures
Passive Surveillance
In the context of the imminent threat of AFS being introduced
into France, the surveillance measures described by Halasa et al.
have been reinforced (24). Mortality scores are systematically
recorded and analyzed over 14-day periods to monitor abnormal
events. Two distinct strategies are considered depending on
the herd size. A herd with over 1,000 pigs and twice the
average mortality rate during the 14-day period—a rate set
at 6% over the period of production (25)—is systematically
subjected to a clinical inspection. In smaller herds (below 1,000
animals), clinical inspections are performed as soon as the
morbidity (computed as the total number of both sick and
dead animals) over two successive weeks reaches twice that of
theoretical mortality. In the event of suspicion during a clinical
visit, serological, and virological investigations are performed
according to the sampling scheme described in Table 1. Blood
and tissue samples are taken, prioritizing clinically-affected and
dead animals. Whenever a suspicion is confirmed, stamping-
out measures are immediately implemented and Surveillance and
Protection Zones (SZ and PZ) are set up within a 10- and 3-km
radius, respectively. The delay between confirmation and total
stamping-out of the herd depends on the on-site culling capacity,
set at 500 head per day nationwide based on expert opinions.
TABLE 1 | Epidemiological predictions of simulated ASF epidemics with surveillance measures adopted in France (24).
Index cases
Nucleus/Multiplier/Farrowing herds Free-range herds
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4
Proportion of undetected outbreaks (%) 12.6 7.1 6.7 6.4 84.8
Time to first detection (days) 15 [11; 21] 14 [11; 20] 14 [11; 20] 14 [11; 19] 9 [6; 26]
Duration of epidemics (days) 23 [15; 47] 22 [15; 38] 22 [15; 41] 21 [15; 36] 20 [6; 47]
Number of infected herds 2 [1; 8] 2 [1; 6] 2 [1; 6] 2 [1; 5] 1 [1; 4]
Number of detected herds 2 [1; 7] 2 [1; 5] 2 [1; 6] 2 [1; 5] 0 [0; 1]
Number of culled animals 3,680 [1020; 14293] 3,019 [1116; 9514] 3,121 [1074; 11498] 2,814 [1100; 9185] 0 [0; 1248]
Number of clinical visits 102 [20; 464] 96 [28; 366] 151 [38; 542] 235 [88; 633] 90 [0; 305]
Number of serological visits 6 [1; 73] 9 [1; 55] 18 [3; 95] 32 [7; 108] 0 [0; 13]
Number of virological visits 3 [1; 32] 3 [1; 18] 4 [1; 34] 8 [1; 36] 0 [0; 10]
Index cases were selected according to the production type and density zones (Figure 2). Results are presented as medians and 5th and 95th percentiles.
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FIGURE 2 | Geographic distribution of French swine production herds and
definition of four density zones according to herd density quartiles.
Surveillance and Protection Zones
All animal movements from and to these zones are prohibited
for 45 (SZ) or 50 days (PZ), and all the herds in these
two zones have to be monitored during that period. Clinical
surveillance as described above is applied to both zones except
for the second point: mortality notification is compulsory and
systematically induces clinical inspection leading to further
laboratory analyses (virology and serology). All herds in PZ are
subject to mandatory serological surveillance visits, for which
the sample size depends on the herd size and type (Table 1).
Breeding animals on boar stud farms, in nucleus and in farrowing
herds located in the surveillance zone are also systematically
subjected to serological tests. All contacts are traced to identify
the possible contact chains from and to infected herds over the
30 days prior to detection. Herds with epidemiological links to
a suspected production site are subjected to clinical, serological
and virological investigations.
Data
The National Swine Identification Database (BDporc) has been
registering all swine movements in France since 2010. Salines
et al. (18) performed a social network analysis on movement
data from 2012 to 2014 in which 10 types of production
herds were identified. Data from year 2014, the latest full-year
dataset at our disposal, were used to analyze the movement
patterns between holding types. Two additional types of site
were also considered: temporary stations (trade centers, TR)
and slaughterhouses. A total of 21,446 sites were geographically
located using the UTM-coordinate system so as to analyze
swine movements based on distance. Four density zones were
designed usingGaussian smoothing kernels, each containing 25%
of the production sites. Movements were analyzed based on the
“animal introduction model” (AIM) described by Salines et al.
(18) to account for transmission through direct contact between
animals from different production sites. Briefly, a one-mode
directed network was built, wherein holdings were considered
as nodes, and movements between two nodes were considered
as links. All movements between two given holdings during the
time period were aggregated into a single link. Links between
holdings represented movements of animals being unloaded at
farms. In-between movements forming a round were replaced
by direct movements between holdings, i.e., intermediate transit
movements of a truck through a farm without any animals being
unloaded were excluded. In order to fulfill the model’s input
requirements, this network was further analyzed to characterize
the connectivity and distance-related contact structure between
the different types of production sites.
Initialization and Analysis of ASF Spread
Based on pig trade network analysis, different scenarios regarding
the type of herd in which ASF could be introduced were
evaluated. We first considered introduction into breeding
herds (nucleus, multiplier, and farrowing herds) having large
outdegrees and movements mainly toward production herds
(18). Seeder herds were randomly selected among the herds
having at least three outgoing movements per month and herd
sizes exceeding 360 animals (third and fourth quartiles). To
analyze the impact of the geographic location of the seed herd
and following the analysis by Halasa et al. (17), 2,000 repetitions
were performed for the breeding herds in each density area.
The second scenario considered the introduction of ASF into
free-range production herds, which are potentially exposed to
infectious pressure exerted by wild boar populations. Here
the seeder herds were randomly selected regardless of their
geographic locations. The latter scenario was run for 2,000
iterations to ensure full geographic coverage of mainland France
and Corsica. The results are displayed in Table 1 and described in
the next subsections.
RESULTS
Geographic Analysis of Swine Movements
A large disparity in swine herd distribution was observed over
continental France and Corsica, with swine densities varying
from 6 to 396 pigs per km² in the four zones. The highest
densities were observed in the western and south-western parts
of France (Figure 2). Each production site was assigned to its
relative density zone to assess the impact of the index case
location on ASF spread and control effectiveness. Excluding
slaughterhouses, post-weaning-finishing and finishing herds
have the highest indegree regarding growing pig movements,
with 42 and 37% of between-site movements, respectively
(Figure 3, left). In contrast, movements of breeding animals
from multiplier herds were mostly directed toward farrow-to-
finish pig herds (57% of movements) (Figure 3, right). Trade
operators also received a high proportion of breeding animal
movements (23%). However, these sites mostly represent a
gathering step on the route to slaughterhouses or exportation;
<1% of outgoing movements of breeding sows from trade
centers were directed toward production sites. The herds were
categorized according to their sizes, defined as the total number
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FIGURE 3 | Characterization of commercial pig movements according to the different herd types sites (BS, boar studs; FA, farrowing; FF, farrow-to-finish; FI, finisher;
FWP, Farrowing-post-weaning; MU, multiplier; PW, post-weaning; PWF, post-weaning—finishing; SEL, nucleus; SP, small production; TR, trade center; WB, wild
boars) (18). Circle sizes represent the relative proportions movements of growing pigs (left) and breeding animals (right).
FIGURE 4 | Distribution of herd sizes according to the type of production sites (BS, boar studs; FA, farrowing; FF, farrow-to-finish; FI, finisher; FWP,
Farrowing-post-weaning; MU, multiplier; PW, post-weaning; PWF, post-weaning—finishing; SEL, nucleus; SP, small production; TR, trade center; WB, wild boars) (18).
of sows, post-weaning and finishing pigs. Farrowing, farrow-
to-finish, multiplier, and nucleus herds represent the largest
proportion of large herds with 68, 67, 70, and 58% of these
herds recorded as having more than 1,000 animals (Figure 4).
Movements of pigs were reported at batch level, with batch size
distribution depending both on the type and size of source herds.
The average batch size contained 72 piglets but ranged between
1 and 432 animals (1–99% percentiles). The largest batch sizes
were observed from farrowing and post-weaning herds, where
batches could exceed 600 individuals. The distribution of the
distances covered by breeding and growing animals revealed
huge discrepancies (Figures 5A,B). The movements of growing
pigs were short-ranged, 55% remaining within a 50-km radius,
and the proportion of movements decreasing exponentially with
increasing distance. In contrast, the farm-to-farm movements
of breeding animals follow a long-tailed unimodal distribution
pattern reaching a peak at 100–150 km distances but going as far
as 850 km.
To evaluate the daily probability of occurrence of between-
herd contact while traveling to the slaughterhouse—considered
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FIGURE 5 | Distribution of distances involved in travel to the slaughterhouse depending on the type of production site: (A) growing pigs, (B) breeding sows.
(C) represents the distribution of between-herd contact distances on the way to the slaughterhouse.
an epidemiological endpoint—movements were analyzed
separately and taking into consideration their frequency for each
herd type. Two production sites on average were visited on route
to slaughterhouses. This value was used to evaluate the number
of contacts drawn from an exponential distribution and balanced
with the distance distribution between source herds and their
associated slaughterhouses (Figure 5C).
Epidemiological Consequences of ASF
Introduction
Introduction Into Breeding Herds
According to the model’s outcomes, and applying the control
and surveillance protocols described above, the spread of ASF
among the swine production units in France was found to be
relatively minor. An illustration of model behavior is provided
in Figure 6. A median number of two herds were infected
throughout the simulations whatever the region of introduction,
and the number of infected herds remained below eight in 95%
of the simulations. On average, 33% of the simulations did
not lead to any secondary infections, the infection remaining
limited to the seeder herd. The percentage of undetected herds
was higher when the index case was introduced in low-density
areas, reaching 12% (as opposed to 6–7% in other areas, Table 1)
with long-distance transmission (Figure 7). Indeed, 75% of
transmission occurrences remained in the introduction zone
when the index case was located in high-density areas. This
percentage fell to 40% in low-density areas and the infection
spread up to 800 km away from the index location. Between
60 and 73% of transmission occurrences involved transmission
from multiplier to farrow-to-finish herds. Fourteen per cent
involved free-range herds when the index herd was in the lowest-
density areas (zones 1 and 2), while this percentage fell to 6
and 2% when the virus was introduced into high-density areas
(zones 3 and 4; data not shown).
Animal movements represented the major transmission
route via the network, accounting for 99.4% of transmission
occurrences; local transmission within a 2-km radius of
infected herds accounted for 0.6% of transmission occurrences.
Medium- and low-risk contacts were only sporadically involved
throughout the simulation process (Table 2). The median time
to first detection was evaluated as 15 days (14–21 days). The
infection-to-detection time for secondary cases was shorter (11
days [3; 17]) due to the implementation of control measures
after the initial detection. The average outbreak duration from
introduction to disease extinction was evaluated at between
21 and 23 days, with variability ranging between 15 and
47 days. This rapid resolution was mainly achieved thanks
to passive and active surveillance policies based on clinical
inspections. The number of clinical, serological, and virological
inspections was positively correlated with density in the area
of the index case. Throughout the simulation process, the
median numbers of clinical visits varied from 102 [20; 464]
in low-density areas to 235 [88; 633] in high-density areas.
However, the median number of serological investigations did
not exceed 32 herds (high-density area), and only eight herds
were subjected to virological investigations (ranges of 1–108 and
1–36, respectively, for serological and virological investigations at
farm level).
Introduction Into Free-Range Herds
Transmission from index herds selected among free-range
production sites was relatively rare. Only 12.5% of simulations
revealed actual transmission from the index case to contact
herds (87.5% with only one infected herd). When transmission
occurred, the number of infected herds could reach 15, but
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FIGURE 6 | Illustration of simulated epidemics according to the density of the zone of introduction, assuming an introduction into Nucleus, Multiplier or Farrowing
herds. For each introduction zone, one simulation was randomly selected among those with effective transmission events. Dark red squares represent the seeder
herds while red spots correspond to the secondary outbreaks.
95% of these simulations resulted in the infection of eight
herds or less. Sixty per cent of transmission occurrences
involved small production herds with fewer than 80 pigs, and
37% concerned free-range herds. In contrast with previous
results, local transmission was clearly identified as the major
transmission route, accounting for 81% of events, whereas animal
movements only represented 11% of transmissions (Table 2).
Taking the whole simulation process, only 15.2% of infected
herds were detected. Due to this low detection rate, which impairs
the rapid implementation of control measures, and despite the
low number of infected herds, the median epidemic duration
was 20 days, though there was substantial variability ranging
from 6 to 47 days. During this period, the number of clinical
inspections reached 96 visits [1; 313] leading to a limited number
of serological and virological investigations (4 [1; 36] and 1 [1;
11], respectively).
Additional Screening of Small Herds
(<300 Pigs)
The previous results clearly evidence the failure to detect
infections occurring in small herds. We therefore assessed the
impact of additional screening measures focusing specifically on
these herds. We assumed that these herds were systematically
subjected to clinical inspection as soon as they declared
more than 15 dead or clinically-infected animals within two
successive weeks (corresponding to an average morbidity of
one animal per day), or when the whole population was
affected during the same period. This latter assumption
factored in the inspection of very small herds, which could
have been easily omitted when considering only the previous
surveillance measures.
The results obtained with this additional screening procedure
are provided in Table 3. Whatever the location of the index herds
(breeding herds), the required number of clinical, serological
and virological inspections was only slightly increased, yet the
detection rate increased drastically since only 1.2–1.8% of the
infected herds remained undetected. The impact of the screening
of small production herds was more pronounced when the
infection was introduced into free-range herds. Indeed, the
detection rate in this case also increased from 15 to 94%. Only
6% of the simulations resulted in secondary cases, still mainly
due to the local transmission route. The time to first detection
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FIGURE 7 | ASF source-to-case distance distributions depending on the
density of the zone of introduction. Four density zones were defined according
to the quartiles of swine production densities (Figure 2).
TABLE 2 | Proportion of ASF outbreaks caused by different mechanisms of
disease spread in simulated epidemics in France.
Index cases
Transmission routes (%) Nucleus/Multiplier/Farrowing
herds
Free-range
herds
Commercial movement of
swine
99.36 11.79
Movement to
slaughterhouse
0 0.17
Local contact 0.59 81.11
Low-risk contact 0 2.43
Medium-risk contact 0.05 4.5
was similar to the previous scenario, but the median epidemic
duration was limited to 12 days [12; 27]. Due to this rapid
detection and short duration of the epidemics, the number of
surveillance visits was significantly lower than in the baseline
scenario, with only 32 [3; 192], 2 [1; 19], and 1 [1; 3] clinical,
serological, and virological inspections, respectively.
DISCUSSION
African swine fever has been spreading throughout Eastern
Europe since 2007 and recently emerged in Western Europe
(12). Although the threat has been highlighted for many years,
the incursion of ASF into Belgium in September 2018 was
relatively surprising since the closest infected countries were
Poland and Hungary (13). The long-distance infectious process,
although not fully elucidated, is deemed to be related to human
activity. Since then, and despite strong control measures, ASF
is continuing to spread among wild boars, with a recent report
of more than 700 positive animals (26). Although fences have
been set up along the neighboring boundaries, the risk of
the ASF virus entering Luxembourg, Germany and France is
non-negligible, and highlights the need for analytical tools to
evaluate the economic and epidemiological consequences of
such an introduction, as well as the efficiency and feasibility
of surveillance/control policies in light of the local context and
specificity of the population structure. The modeling framework
designed by Halasa et al. (16) was dedicated to this issue
and was used in their study to evaluate the spread of the
virus among the Danish swine production network. This model
was therefore chosen for application to the French situation,
which required factoring in realistic geographic distribution of
production sites as well as features related to the structure of
French pig movements within the population (18). The authors
have chosen not to discuss here the epidemiological assumptions
and parameters behind the model, which were already well-
discussed by the original authors. Therefore, the discussion will
focus on the main conclusions and prospects for the future
that could be derived from the model’s outcomes. This study
evaluated two different scenarios of introduction depending on
the type of herd selected as the index case.
The first scenario considered an introduction into herds at the
top of the pyramidal structure of the French swine production
system: nucleus, multiplier and farrowing herds. Although these
kinds of herds are expected to have the highest biosecurity
measures, hence the lowest probability of virus introduction, the
structural analysis of the pig trade network highlighted these
herds as having the highest outdegrees and outgoing contact
chains (18), so they may be considered the most vulnerable
links in the production chain. In other words, these herds
are likely to have epidemiological links with many commercial
partners, which may lead to the transfer of pathogens whenever
they become infected. Four density zones were designed to
represent the quartiles of swine herd densities in France (6–396
pigs per square kilometer). Index herds were randomly selected
within each zone to analyze the impact of their location on the
epidemiological process and surveillance/control requirements.
The zone of viral introduction was not found to have an impact
on the number of cases, time to detection or the infection routes
linked to the transmission process. The infection was transmitted
relatively little, with a median of two infected herds [1; 5]. The
transmission contact chains were limited to one main effector
herd: seeder herds were the main transmission effectors, with
secondary infected sources being only very sporadically involved
(0.2–0.4% of simulations). This may be explained both by the
pyramidal structure of the French pig production sector and by
the reactiveness of the surveillance and control policies, with
a median hot period evaluated at 15 days [11; 21]. However,
further analysis revealed a huge difference in the geographic
dispersion of the virus when index cases were simulated in low-
or high-density areas, with distances between the sources and
related cases potentially reaching 800 km when the index case
was in a low-density area. This kind of transmission may allow
the virus to emerge in more densely populated areas, in turn
inducing a higher risk of local spread and potentially exposing a
higher number of susceptible herds to infection, thus increasing
the duration of epidemics nationally. Owing to the emergency
surveillance and control policies set up in France following the
emergence of ASF in Belgium, all large herds with twice the
average mortality rates, and all smaller herds (fewer than 1,000
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TABLE 3 | Epidemiological predictions of simulated ASF epidemics with surveillance measures adopted in France (7) and additional screening of small production sites.
Index cases
Nucleus/Multiplier/Farrowing herds Free-range herds
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4
Proportion of undetected outbreaks (%) 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 3.7
First detection (days) 15 [11; 22] 14 [11; 21] 14 [11; 20] 14 [11; 19] 10 [1; 17]
Duration of epidemics (days) 23.5 [15; 50] 22 [15; 39] 22 [15; 44] 22 [14; 39] 12 [2; 27]
Number of infected herds 2 [1; 9] 2 [1; 6] 2 [1; 6] 2 [1; 5] 1 [1; 2]
Number of detected herds 2 [1; 9] 2 [1; 6] 2 [1; 6] 2 [1; 5] 1 [0; 2]
Number of culled animals 3,781 [1020; 15879] 3,048 [1110; 10406] 3,210 [1121; 13277] 2,985 [1100; 10187] 23 [0; 920]
Number of clinical visits 105 [21; 455] 106 [27; 358] 164 [42; 603] 255 [93; 646] 31 [3; 192]
Number of serological visits 7 [1; 83] 10 [1; 57] 19 [3; 108] 36 [8; 121] 2 [0; 19]
Number of virological visits 3 [1; 33] 3 [1; 21] 5 [1; 48] 11 [1; 49] 1 [0; 15]
Index cases were selected according to the production type and density zones (Figure 2). Results are presented as medians and 5th and 95th percentiles.
animals) with a 2-fold increase in morbidity (total number of
clinically suspect and dead pigs) within a 14-day period have to be
clinically inspected. This passive surveillance protocol was found
to be relatively efficient in detecting ASF cases, with detection
rates reaching 94%, while keeping the number of clinical visits
to a minimum. Indeed, for outbreaks lasting between 15 and 41
days, the median number of clinical visits required was evaluated
at 102 when the index case was in a low-density area, and up
to 235 when in a high-density area, representing, respectively,
0.5 and 1% of the total number of production sites. A similar
trend was obtained for serological and virological visits, which
are mainly carried out to confirm clinical suspicions and which
did not exceed 108 and 36, respectively, for high-density areas.
However, it should be noted that the detection rate in the lowest-
density area was lower than that obtained in the other areas (88
vs. 93–94%). This was mainly due to the failure to detect ASF in
small herds, where the infection may fade out before any clinical
visits could be planned.
The second scenario considered free-range pig herds as
index cases, assuming this type of production site to be more
susceptible to viral exposure through potential contact with
wild boars. Keeping the same model structure and assumptions,
the results obtained here were quite different from those
obtained with the previous scenario. Indeed, the infection was
contained within seeder herds in 87.5% of simulations. When
transmission did occur, however, up to 15 herds could be
infected, clearly identifying a real risk of transmission even
from herds with little network connectivity. Furthermore, local
transmission was clearly the main transmission route in this
case, corresponding to transmission via material shared between
neighboring herds, whereas pig movements played a major
role in the previous scenario. Although the tracing of pig
movements is well-documented (18) and may be used to identify
epidemiological links between the different production sites, the
local transmission pathway may be more difficult to assess due
to the lack of traceability. This fact, along with the relatively
small herd size of free-range sites, may contribute to the poor
detection results achieved, with a detection rate of only 15.3%
despite the global number of clinical, serological, and virological
visits, which was similar to that obtained in low-density areas for
the first scenario.
Based on these results, we decided to evaluate the impact of
additional screening focusing on small herds with<300 animals.
We therefore assumed a systematic clinical inspection of these
small herds when either the number of clinically infected or
dead animals exceeded the threshold value of 15 pigs over a
14-day period (on average more than one affected or dead
pig per day), or the whole population was affected during
the same period. With this additional surveillance measure,
the detection rate exceeded 95% for all scenarios with the
same number of visits. Although the hot periods were similar
when the index case involved a free-range herd, the higher
detection rate allowed a faster reaction time, thus avoiding
further secondary cases (only 4% of simulations in this case
were affected by secondary infections). Furthermore, in this
specific case, shortening the infection process through enhanced
screening of small herds also enabled the number of herd visits
to be made during the epidemic to be reduced. These results
clearly show the beneficial impact of targeted surveillance on
small herds in addition to the emergency surveillance protocol
already in place.
Although specific surveillance and control measures were
integrated to represent the current situation in France, the
model’s outcomes were in close agreement with the results
of Halasa et al. (16, 27). African swine fever undoubtedly
has one of the highest case-fatality rates among pig diseases.
However, our results evidenced a low degree of permeability
of the swine production network regarding the virus’s invasion
potential, which is nevertheless highly dependent on the
awareness and vigilance of all the actors and stakeholders
in the production system (28) and the availability of the
resources needed for clinical visits, sampling, analyses and on-
site culling. Assumptions have been made in this evaluation,
but the model could also be used to assess more precisely the
impact in different scenarios of the availability of resources
on the duration of ASF epidemics. In the present work, only
domestic pigs were considered and a single introduction site
was assumed. This major assumption may be overoptimistic
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regarding the pressure of infection exerted by wildlife in
all the countries infected thus far (29, 30). Thulke and
Lange developed a spatially explicit individual-based model
to represent ASF spread in the wild boar population, and
provided evaluations of control measures based on the
implementation of fences, population management, and carcass
removal procedures (31–33). Coupling these two approaches
would provide the opportunity to analyze the infectious
processes as a whole, which is a real challenge when attempting
to manage a disease at the interface between wild and
domestic ecosystems.
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